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Earnings management and the role of auditors in an unusual IFRS context:  
The case of Greece 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on January 1, 
2005 aimed to improve the quality of financial reporting in Greece, which had been regularly 
criticized for the practice of earnings management and the ineffectiveness of external 
auditing. However, the unusual characteristics of the economic environment and institutional 
setting of code-law oriented Greece, has made the attempt even more challenging. To 
investigate the role of auditors in potentially approving managers’ opportunistic behaviour in 
the post-IFRS period, we examine the relationship between earnings management, measured 
by signed discretionary accruals, and auditor reporting, measured by audit firm size (Big 4 vs. 
non-Big 4) and audit opinion type (unqualified vs. qualified). Using a sample of firms listed 
on the Athens Stock Exchange over a five-year period, we find that the size of the audit firm 
does not affect the level of earnings management, and the audit opinion qualification is not 
issued in response to management’s opportunistic behaviour. The interpretation of the results 
is conditional on the Greek context, where the economic bonding of auditors with their clients 
is strong, investor protection is low, enforcement mechanisms are weak and there is low 
litigation and reputation loss, even in the post-IFRS period. 
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1. Introduction  
Greece has often been in the spotlight for the inadequate quality of financial reporting. Before 
the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to all consolidated 
and individual accounts of publicly traded firms beginning on January 1, 2005, the quality of 
Greek accounting standards and disclosure practices had been criticized in the European 
financial press and investors’ community. Some of the complaints were that Greek accounting 
standards allowed firms to use too much discretion, lacked detailed disclosures, were 
designed to satisfy the information needs of users, permitted reporting that was too heavily 
influenced by tax avoidance strategies, and had no effective enforcement mechanisms. 
Empirical studies of international comparison among countries have illustrated that Greece 
exhibits the highest level of earnings management and opacity (Bhattacharya, Daouk, & 
Welker, 2003; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003).  
 The practice of earnings management indicates a breakdown in the financial reporting 
process (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004). When in doubt of the reliability of 
financial statements, users turn their attention to the auditor’s report. Theoretically, external 
auditors play a key role as a monitoring mechanism in assuring the integrity of accounting 
figures and in reducing the agency costs, resulting from managers’ opportunistic incentives.1 
However, the effectiveness of external auditing in Greece has also been questioned by various 
parties, i.e. finance institutions, investors, journalists, and politicians (Leventis, Weetman, & 
Caramanis, 2011). 
 In this study, we aim to investigate the relationship between earnings management and 
auditor reporting for firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for the post-IFRS 
period 2005-2009. While research on earnings management is abundant, the role of auditors 
in potentially approving managers’ opportunistic behaviour needs to be further investigated. 
To address this research question we focus on Greece for two reasons. First, it is interesting to 
investigate if code-law oriented Greece, criticized for the inadequate quality of financial and 
auditor reporting, has made improvements after the adoption of IFRS, which are designed to 
1Other monitoring mechanisms identified in the literature are the composition and characteristics of the board of 
directors and audit committees (Peasnell, Pope, & Young 2005; Lee & Mande 2005; Lee, Ortman, & Mande 
2004; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt 2003; Klein 2002; Beasley 1996) and ownership structure (Chung, Firth, & Kim 
2002). Incentives range from bonus plans (Shuto 2007; Balsam 1998; Gaver & Gaver 1998; Baber, Kang, & 
Kumar 1998), avoidance of debt covenant violations (Sweeney 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994), insider 
trading (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Beneish & Vargus 2002) to meeting analysts’ and management’s 
forecasts (Burgstahler & Eames 2006; DeGeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser 1999). 
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provide more useful financial statements, compared to the legalistic, politically and tax-
influenced standards that historically have characterized Continental Europe  (Ball, 2006).  
 Second, Greece is a small country that has undergone serious reforms over the last few 
years. The Greek economy was affected by the global recession, which began in 2007, and 
showed the first signs of sovereign debt crisis in 2009. In 2010 the concerns intensified, the 
crisis deepened and the public debt became unsustainable. The country turned to the European 
Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
for financial support, which included ‘rescue packages’, conditional on the implementation of 
harsh austerity measures, such as restrictive income policy and drastic limitation of public 
expenses. The financial problems of Greece have spread to other weak economies in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. Ireland and Portugal, and the contagion effect has 
become a perceived problem for the whole EU. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate 
various financial aspects of such a small country, which threatens the stability of the EU.   
 We use signed discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, and as 
proxies for auditor reporting we use audit firm size (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), and audit opinion 
type (unqualified vs. qualified).2 Specifically, since the purpose of an external audit is to 
improve financial reporting quality, we examine if there are observable differences in 
discretionary accruals between clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms.3 Then, we 
investigate if there is a difference in the type of audit report issued in response to the level of 
discretionary accruals possibly employed by a firm. As an additional test, we examine 
whether the auditor’s propensity to issue a qualified report is similar for Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors. As Arnedo, Lizarraga, and Sanchez (2008)4 state, a re-examination of these 
relationships is justified if we consider recent findings, which suggest that Big 4 auditors act 
less conservatively in countries with less restrictive regulations or in countries where 
stakeholders make lower demands for the quality of auditing.  
 Our results reveal that auditors, either Big 4 or non-Big 4, have weak incentives to 
prevent earnings management, and the audit opinion qualification is not issued in response to 
management’s opportunistic behaviour. As for the additional test, Big 4 auditors have a 
2 These proxies are typically termed as audit quality attributes and are used interchangeably throughout the 
study.  
3 For practical reasons, Big 4 refers not only to current Big 4 but also to previous Big 5, 6 and 8 audit firms, 
where appropriate.  
4 Although Arnedo et al. (2008) examined these relationships in Spain, a country from the Euro-Continental 
accounting model, their results are based on a sample of private firms that filed for bankruptcy during a pre-IFRS 
period from 1993 to 2002.  
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greater propensity to issue unqualified reports, which is attributed to client characteristics and 
not to auditor size. In sum, IFRS implementation has not alleviated the influences of the 
economic environment and institutional setting of Greece in the auditor and financial 
reporting process. 
  The findings can provide insights to investors, who have become the major target of 
the Greek government policy. From the early stages of the crisis, the Greek government 
realized that the attraction of foreign direct and indirect investments could assist the Greek 
economy to overcome the financial sovereign crisis.5 A series of reforms aimed at the 
development of a more attractive investment and business environment, including 
liberalization of a number of markets, faster licensing procedures, flexibility in the labour 
market, competitive real estate prices, new Investment Law, as well as a reduction in the cost 
of production. Consequently, investors who consult financial statements when they consider 
entering the Greek market should be aware of these relationships;6 they can rely on the 
auditor’s report to make inferences about financial reporting quality, but the report is valuable 
to them only to the extent that is accurate, relevant and reliable (Ryu & Rho, 2007).  
 Furthermore, standard setters and regulators should be conscious of the fact that to 
accomplish international harmonization of auditing and financial reporting, the distinctive 
characteristics of each country need to be examined carefully. There must also be appropriate 
country level incentives and enforcement mechanisms. Francis and Wang (2006) state that 
enforcement mechanisms may matter more than a country’s accounting standards in shaping 
earnings and audit quality. It is apparent that, despite IFRS implementation, earnings 
management still exists, and auditors also may behave opportunistically. Therefore, regulators 
have to enact standards and rules that limit the opportunistic behaviours of both.  
 Additionally, the study contributes to the literature of earnings management and 
auditing since these relations have not received considerable attention in Greece, and the 
findings from common-law countries may not be applicable. Our study is one of the first to 
5 The net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow in Greece showed a decrease of 5.82% in 2010 compared with 
2009. However, this decrease is low taking into consideration the financial debt crisis. The total foreign capital 
gross inflows, which reflect the real performance of the country in the attraction of foreign investments, showed 
an increase of 4.96% in 2010 (Bank of Greece, 2011). 
6 Countries with strong investment presence in Greece in recent years include Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The U.S. presence is relatively low, suggesting future 
investment potentials. Prospects also exist to attract investors from Russia and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
Arab countries and Asia, particularly China, who are mainly interested in the energy, telecommunications, 
tourism, transport, finance, real estate and logistics sectors (Bank of Greece, 2011). 
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examine earnings management and the role of auditors in the post IFRS period for a five-year 
sample. Finally, it is the first time that the cross-sectional modified-Jones model with cash 
flow from operations (CFO) (Larcker & Richardson, 2004) and the cross-sectional modified-
Jones model with prior year return on assets (ROA) (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) are 
applied in Greece. 
 The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2 the Greek setting is 
described. Section 3 presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 4 
outlines the research design, while Section 5 describes the sample and data. In Section 6 the 
empirical results are presented. Section 7 includes sensitivity tests and Section 8 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Background  
2.1. Cultural factors 
 Greece is a Euro-Continental, code law country. It shares similar attributes with other 
Euro-Continental countries but also has some unusual national features. During the last few 
decades, Greece has been modernized, but Greek culture, politics and economics remain 
affected by a duality of Eastern and Western influences (Caramanis 2005). The European 
Community membership in 1981, the influence of the Greek General Accounting Plan from 
the French Plan and the European Union Directives (Koumanakos, Siriopoulos, &  
Georgopoulos 2005), and the mandatory implementation of IFRS by all Greek listed firms, 
have played a major role in the modernization process (Tsalavoutas, Andre, & Evans 2008). 
 Consistent with the cultural values outlined by Hofstede (1980, 1991) and Gray 
(1988), Greece is characterized by high statutory control, uniformity, conservatism and 
uncertainty avoidance. In fact, in Hofstede’s research, Greece appears as an outlier in terms of 
uncertainty avoidance, and also scores highly in power distance and masculinity (Ballas, 
Skoutela, & Tzovas 2010). Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo (2008) rank Greece third, after 
Venezuela and Portugal, in terms of secrecy, first, along with Colombia, in ownership 
concentration, and first as the most uncertainty avoiding country in their sample. Similarly, in 
Tsakumis, Curatola, and Porcano (2007), Greece has the highest score of uncertainty 
avoidance among 50 countries.  
 
2.2. Corporate environment  
The family firm has been an important and common form of business organization in Greece, 
where ownership is concentrated and closely tied to a group of people (Spanos, Tsipouri, & 
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Xanthakis 2008). Typically, family members are also board members and executives, and are 
involved in the direct management of the firm (Spanos et al. 2008). Managers in such firms 
communicate information regarding their performance directly to their superior owner-
managers, without having to rely upon financial statements (Tzovas 2006). 
 In this business setting, banks are the major source of financing. In many instances, 
the banks obtain directly all financial information required, without having to rely upon 
publicly disclosed data since they develop close personal relations with the owners of the 
firm. In some cases, they own part of the firm’s share capital (Tzovas 2006). As expected, 
banks do not always base their credit decisions on entirely objective financial data. 
Consequently, the importance of public accounting information is further diminished (Tzovas 
2006).  
 In the late 1990s, the significant use of initial public offerings (IPO) as a means of 
raising capital turned many firms from private-family owned to publicly listed firms (Spanos 
2005), without changing the fact that the main shareholder, the family, may still hold the 
majority of the firm’s equity capital (Lazarides 2010). The development of the ASE and the 
presence of international capital and institutional investors, followed by the crash of 2000-
2001, and the employment of professional managers by listed firms were only some of the 
driving forces for the increased requirement of effective corporate governance. Law 
3016/2002 contained detailed instructions about the form of a firm’s corporate governance, 
with the aim of promoting the internationally significant protection of shareholders’ rights 
(Dimitropoulos & Asteriou 2008) and securing the proper functioning of the market.  
 Although improvements in corporate governance have occurred, empirical studies 
reveal that they are primarily confined to a small number of large listed firms (Spanos et al. 
2008). Chalevas and Tzovas (2010) suggest that the introduction of corporate governance 
mechanisms had a limited impact upon crucial corporate issues. For example, the extent to 
which managers attempt to manipulate firm’s earnings has not been affected considerably 
(Chalevas & Tzovas 2010) since satisfactory results of firms is a prerequisite to raise money 
from banks and from the ASE (Baralexis 2004). On the whole, Greek listed firms have 
aligned their activities with the general corporate governance legislative framework, but they 
are not accustomed entirely to the philosophy of modern corporate governance 
(Dimitropoulos & Asteriou 2010).  
 
2.3. Accounting framework - IFRS 
8 
The Greek accounting system has been stakeholder oriented, tax-driven, and conservative 
(Spathis & Georgakopoulou 2007; Ballas 1994). The income tax rate is perceived to be 
unfairly high and many firms attempt to pay the least taxes by exploiting or violating the law 
with tax evasion strategies, creative accounting and earnings management (Baralexis 2004). 
Greece ranks 19th among 50 countries in tax evasion, following the less developed Latin and 
near Eastern European areas (Tsakumis et al. 2007). 
 Firms have to prepare two different sets of accounts for accounting and tax purposes. 
This requirement creates a cost-benefit trade-off in the firm’s accounting policy decisions. A 
preference for higher tax-savings results in lower reported profit figures, which in turn, may 
influence unfavourably the cost of capital of the firm, i.e. the bank’s credit decisions, and the 
share price of the firm (Tzovas 2006). Considering the fact that, in Greece, accounting figures 
have a dominant influence on a firm’s share price, firms are more likely to adopt income 
increasing accounting policies, regardless of the important tax costs associated with this 
decision (Tzovas 2006). In other words, the cost of profit overstatement, which is higher 
income taxes, is less than the benefit derived from such overstatement (Baralexis 2004). Even 
so, there are few listed firms that understate, rather than overstate profit (Baralexis 2004).  
 Greece was among the first adopters of IFRS in the EU (Ballas et al. 2010). Hope, Jin 
and Kang (2006) document that countries with weak shareholder protection bond themselves 
to superior accounting standards, in order to improve disclosure policies and accounting 
systems, to enhance the integration of domestic markets into world markets, and to accelerate 
economic growth. However, higher-quality standards do not automatically lead to higher-
quality financial reporting (Ball 2001). 
 Empirical studies show that the transition to IFRS has not been easy or without 
problems and has been aggravated by the lack of preparedness of firms and accountants 
(Spathis & Georgakopoulou 2007). Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) measure the 
difference between local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and IFRS on 21 
key accounting dimensions and rank Greece first among 26 countries. In Li (2010), Greece 
has the lowest score of legal enforcement mechanisms regarding IFRS implementation, and 
the highest scores in ‘additional disclosures required by IFRS relative to local standards’ and 
‘the number of inconsistencies between local standards and IFRS’. Likewise, Greece has the 
highest number of issues absent from local GAAP, but covered by International Auditing 
Standards (IAS), and is tenth among 28 countries concerning divergence, the differences 
between national rules and IAS (Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, & Stolowy 2007).  
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 Although Greece was not prepared for the adoption of IFRS, the widespread belief is 
that the adoption has increased reliability, transparency and comparability of financial 
statements (Ballas et al. 2010). Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) examined the post-adoption 
effects of the implementation of IFRS in Greece and found that the effects in the official year 
of adoption appear to be unfavourable but improve significantly in the subsequent period. 
Karampinis and Hevas (2011) reveal that IFRS had only minor impact on the value relevance 
and conditional conservatism of accounting income, suggesting that simultaneous 
infrastructure changes are required in order to make any material improvements in financial 
reporting.7 Ball (2006) argues that integration has occurred, notably in the capital and product 
markets, but most market and political forces are local and will remain so for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
2.4. The audit market  
Corporate auditing was first introduced in Greece in 1955 with the establishment of the state-
controlled Body of Chartered Accountants (SOL). Until then, corporate auditing of annual 
financial statements was a formal ‘ironic’ act towards the government, shareholders and other 
interested parties because auditors limited their task to signing the report, which was already 
composed by the board of directors of the audited company (SOEL 2009). SOL emerged as a 
state-regulated professional body with significant privileges and an authorized monopoly over 
audit practice (Dedoulis & Caramanis 2007).  
 The most important rivalry to SOL was the Association of Certified Accountants and 
Auditors (SELE), which was established in 1979 by partners in international accounting firms 
operating in Greece (Caramanis & Lennox 2008). However, members of SELE were 
prohibited by law from conducting statutory audits, and their services were limited to tax and 
management consultancy (Caramanis 1998). In 1992 the Greek auditing profession was 
7 To examine the relevance of IFRS to the Greek market, Ballas et al. (2010) used a mixed methodology relying 
on secondary sources - a survey of the literature regarding cultural factors, the Greek economic environment and 
corporate governance structure, as well as the results of a postal survey to finance managers of the top 100 Greek 
firms, with 24 usable responses.  Iatridis and Rouvolis (2010) examined the degree of earnings management 
under IFRS, the value relevance of IFRS-based accounting numbers, and transition effects on the financial 
results of Greek listed firms for the 2004-2006 period. Karampinis and Hevas (2011) explored the effects of 
IFRS on two properties of accounting income: value relevance and conditional conservatism, for a three year 
post-IFRS period. 
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liberalized. Opponents of the reform argued that by liberalizing the profession, auditors would 
serve the interests of their clients and not of the public, while liberalization supporters 
claimed that competition in the audit market would advance the quality and reliability of 
audits (Caramanis 1998). After a political struggle between the two organizations, SOL and 
SELE, SOL was abolished by the government and was reformed to a big private audit firm, 
SOL S.A. A new accounting organization, the Body of Chartered Auditors and Accountants 
(SOEL), was created to self-regulate the audit profession (Caramanis & Lennox 2008).  
 SOL S.A. has been the dominant Greek audit firm, although several small Greek and 
international audit firms have entered the market; since 2005, after mergers and the collapse 
of Arthur Andersen, there remained four multinational audit firms, i.e. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG, and 
15 Greek and second-tier international audit firms.   
 The Greek Auditing Standards (GAS) published in the Government Gazette (issue 
1589/B/22.10.2004) were developed according to the IAS of the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC). The Greek Legislation, with Law 3639/2008, is in full compliance with 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual and consolidated accounts.  
 The Greek Ministry of Economy, responding to the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 
2002, which introduced major changes to the regulation of financial practice and corporate 
governance, established the Committee of Accounting Standardization and Auditing (ELTE) 
in 2003. ELTE was supposed to conduct random annual inspections of approximately 10% of 
listed firms’ financial statements. In cooperation with the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission (HCMC), ELTE strived to create a robust supervisory body in order to alleviate 
concerns over audit quality and the credibility of financial reporting. Unfortunately, ELTE has 
received considerable criticism because it has not yet become an effective enforcement 
mechanism. In the Greek environment of weak disciplinary authorities and low probability of 
litigation by third parties, concerns over auditors’ potential opportunistic behaviour still 
remain. 
   
2.5. Auditor’s report 
With the implementation of IFRS and the new auditing rules, the form and content of the 
auditor’s report has been modified. Auditors are obliged to express one of the following 
opinions on the financial statements, in the opinion paragraph of the report: (1) unqualified 
opinion, (2) qualified opinion, with matters that do not affect the auditor’s overall opinion, (3) 
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qualified opinion, with matters that do affect the auditor’s overall opinion, (4) adverse 
opinion, and (5) disclaimer of opinion. 
 It should be mentioned that a particularity of the Greek auditor’s report is that there is 
not a clear distinction between unqualified and qualified opinions, apart from the adverse 
opinion, where the auditor’s verdict is clearly stated. For instance, a qualified opinion can 
include, in the explanatory paragraph, remarks about matters that both ‘affect’ and ‘do not 
affect the auditor’s overall opinion’. However, it could end with a phrase such as ‘… with the 
exception of the consequences of the above issues, in our opinion, the aforementioned 
financial statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the firm as of 31 
December 20XX.. .’ Thus, it is in the subjective judgment of the user to decide whether or not 
the remarks are materially important, and whether or not they should be taken into 
consideration. 
 Lately, there is growing concern that firms have established the practice of not 
performing or undervaluing specific estimates, such as tax liabilities, lawsuits in progress, bad 
debts, and due liabilities. If these estimates were taken into consideration or valued more 
realistically, they would reduce considerably reported earnings. In a content analysis of audit 
reports, Grant Thornton (2010) discovered that the most frequent qualification of ASE listed 
firms for 2009 is ‘the uncertain outcome of future State tax audits’. 
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 Past US studies show that clients of Big 4 auditors, compared to clients of non-Big 4 
auditors, use lower levels of discretionary accruals (Chung, Firth, & Kim 2003; Francis, 
Maydew, & Sparks 1999; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam 1998). Recent 
studies (Cassell, Giroux, Myers, & Omer 2011; Boone, Khurana, & Raman 2010; Krishnan, 
Park, & Vijayakumar 2008), indicate that the enactment of the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
Arthur Andersen’s demise, and the promotion of second-tier firms by regulators and interest 
groups as a viable alternative to the Big 4, has led to some migration from Big 4 to smaller 
auditors. The conclusion of the recent research is that the flight of audit clients from the Big 4 
to second tier auditors has not impaired audit quality. 
 These findings are based, however, on data from countries where auditors face high 
litigation risk when they provide low-quality audits. Recent research documents that Big 4 
behaviour, with respect to earnings management, is not uniform around the world and varies 
systematically among countries with differences in economic environments and institutional 
settings (Arnedo et al. 2008). Francis and Wang (2006) conjecture that Big 4 auditors impose 
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higher earnings quality and greater accounting conservatism on clients’ financial reports as a 
rational response to stricter investor protection regimes, including the ability of investors to 
sue auditors for negligence and the power of regulators to sanction auditors for misconduct. It 
follows that when investor protection is low, large and small auditors have similar incentives, 
and there should be no observable differences in earnings quality between Big 4 and non-Big 
4 clients (Francis & Wang 2006; Francis 2004). Studies in countries such as Korea, Belgium 
and France provide evidence that there is no statistically significant difference between the 
level of discretionary accruals of firms audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors (Othman & 
Zeghal 2006; Jeong & Rho 2004; Vander Bauwhede & Willekens 2004). 
 In Greece, the risk of litigation by a third party is small and auditors have little 
incentive to exert effort in detecting an existing problem or material error, despite the audit 
scandals that have featured prominently in both the daily press and specialist publications 
(Caramanis & Lennox 2008). Auditors may not believe they have a high likelihood of getting 
caught by the government if they provide low-quality audits (Jeong & Rho 2004).  The 
economic bonding (DeAngelo 1981) encourages auditors to report favourably in order to 
retain influential clients and make more revenues, particularly if the client is large. In a 
relationship-based economy, such as Greece, where auditors typically have personal ties to 
management, it is less likely for auditors to maintain a high level of independence (Jeong & 
Rho 2004). As Kim, Chung and Firth (2003) note, external auditing acts as an effective 
deterrent to opportunistic earnings managements, only when auditors’ preferences over 
accrual choices conflict with managers’ preferences. Using discretionary accruals as a 
measure of earnings management, and audit firm size as a measure of audit quality, our first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: In Greece, discretionary accruals are not associated with the size of the audit firm 
(Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), other things being equal. 
 
 The above discussion leads us to the next hypothesis that examines whether the type 
of audit report is issued in response to the level of discretionary accruals. The evidence on this 
association is, again, mixed. A stream of research supports the view that qualified reports are 
positively related to the level of discretionary accruals (Koumanakos, Georgopoulos, & 
Siriopoulos 2008; Bartov, Gul, & Tsui 2000; Francis & Krishnan 1999), while another 
supports the opposite (Bradshaw, Richardson, & Sloan 1999). Finally, Butler, Leone and 
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Willenborg (2004) find no evidence that firms receiving qualified audit opinions manage 
earnings more than those receiving unqualified opinions.  
 Another stream of research finds that qualified reports do not mean per se higher audit 
quality (Arnedo et al. 2008; Butler et al. 2004; Nelson, Elliott, & Tarpley 2002). In the 
negotiation process before the issuance of the audit report, the auditor discusses with 
management any material misstatements or departures from GAAP, and requests that 
management make the relevant adjustments (Butler et al. 2004). Higher quality auditors are 
regarded as the ones that get the client’s errors booked before the issue of the audit report. In 
that case, a lower level of discretionary accruals should be expected, and thus the issuance of 
an unqualified opinion. 
 In Greece, where the auditor’s incentives are not the same as in common law 
countries, this argument may not hold. The negotiation process is performed at a different 
level and it is likely that management will refuse to adjust the financial statements. Then, the 
auditor has two choices, either to give in to client pressure and issue an unqualified report, 
waving material errors and/or departures from GAAP, or issue a qualified report. In the 
second case, the vagueness of the Greek audit report gives options for qualification, leaving 
both parties satisfied. Auditors can issue the ‘qualified opinion, with matters that do not affect 
the auditor’s overall opinion’ as an alternative to the more severe types of qualified opinions. 
In this way they reduce the possibility of either dissatisfying or losing their clients, and at the 
same time, they avoid the case of not issuing a qualified report at all. Therefore, our second 
hypothesis is: 
 
H2: In Greece, the audit opinion (unqualified vs. qualified) is not associated with 
discretionary accruals, other things being equal. 
 
 The final hypothesis investigates whether the type of audit opinion issued is related to 
the size of the audit firm. Past studies argue that since Big 4 audit firms are of higher quality, 
they are more likely than non-Big 4 firms to report earnings management, when they detect it, 
by issuing qualified audit reports (Gaeremynck, Van Der Meulen, & Willekens 2008; 
Gaeremynck & Willekens 2003; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam 2002; DeFond, 
Wong, & Li 2000). Other studies show that non-Big 4 are more likely to qualify because they 
do not have the same capacity to detect errors and irregularities as the Big 4 firms, and 
qualification is a conservative strategy to compensate for this lack of capacity (Ryu & Roh 
2007; Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton 2002). Finally, other studies document that the size of 
14 
the audit firm does not affect auditors’ propensity to qualify their opinions (Caramanis & 
Spathis 2006; Chan, Lin, & Mo 2006; Bartov et al. 2000). 
 We expect that if audit quality is the same for both types of audit firms, as stated in 
Hypothesis 1, there should also be no differentiation in the audit qualification; Big 4 auditors 
are equally likely to issue qualified opinions as non-Big 4 auditors. Building on the same 
arguments of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we form our last hypothesis as follows: 
 
H3: In Greece, the audit opinion type (unqualified vs. qualified) is not associated with 
the size of the audit firm (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4), other things being equal. 
 
4. Research design                                                                                                                                        
4.1. Estimation of discretionary accruals 
 For the purpose of our analysis, we use discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings 
management. The manipulation of accruals to move underlying profits towards some desired 
level of earnings is a favoured instrument of earnings management. Because accruals are 
components of earnings that are not reflected in current cash flows, they have no direct cash 
flow consequence and are relatively difficult to detect (Peasnell et al. 2005). Researchers 
usually separate discretionary components from total accruals, by subtracting non-
discretionary accruals, to examine the degree of earnings management. An important problem 
with this approach is the difficulty in separating operating accruals into discretionary and non-
discretionary components.  
 The most frequently used model in the literature for the estimation of discretionary 
accruals is the Jones (1991) model. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) developed the 
modified-Jones model, which is designed to eliminate the conjectured tendency of the Jones 
(1991) model to measure discretionary accruals with error when managerial discretion is 
exercised over revenues (Bartov et al. 2000). To test our hypotheses, we rely on two 
alternative models in order to ensure the robustness of our results: 1) the modified-Jones 
model with cash flow from operations (Larcker & Richardson 2004), and 2) the modified-
Jones model with prior-year return on assets (Kothari et al. 2005).  
 Discretionary accruals are usually estimated using time-series data of the same firm or 
cross-sectional data of the industry that the sample firm belongs to (Jeong & Rho 2004). 
According to Larcker and Richardson (2004), the time-series approach assumes temporal 
stationarity of parameter estimates, whereas the cross-sectional approach assumes 
homogeneity across firms in the same industry. For the purposes of our study, we adopt the 
15 
cross-sectional approach. An advantage of using this approach is that specific year changes in 
economic conditions affecting expected accruals are filtered out since the model is re-
estimated every year (Johl, Jubb, & Houghton 2007). The two cross-sectional discretionary 
accruals models applied are described below. 
  
4.1.1. Modified-Jones model with CFO  
 The first measure of discretionary accruals, DACFO, is obtained from Larcker and 
Richardson (2004), who added CFO to the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) in an 
effort to reduce measurement errors, as follows: 
 
TAit/Ait-1   = β0 + β1t (1/Ait-1) + β2t ((ΔREVit - ΔRECit) / Ait-1) + β3t (PPEit /Ait-1) + β4t  
(CFOit /Ait-1) + εit                                                                                                                               (1)                                                         
 
where for firm i year t,  
 
TAit = total accruals8; 
Ait-1          = total assets (year t-1);  
ΔREVit = change in net revenues from year t-1 to year t; 
ΔRECit = change in net accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t; 
PPEit = property, plant and equipment; 
CFOit = cash flow from operations; 
εit    = random error term 
  
 The estimated discretionary accruals, DACFO, are the difference between actual total 
accruals and the fitted values of the accruals from model (1). A higher level of discretionary 
accruals, positive or negative, indicates a greater level of earnings management. 
 
4.1.2. Modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA  
 The second measure of discretionary accruals, DAROA, is obtained by applying the 
model developed by Kothari et al. (2005), who stated that accruals of firms that have 
8 Total accruals are calculated using the cash flow approach proposed by Hribar and Collins (2002) as an 
alternative to balance sheet approach, defined as operating income minus operating cash flows. 
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experienced unusual performance are expected to be systematically non zero, and thus firm 
performance is correlated with accruals. They added current-year ROA and prior-year ROA to 
the modified-Jones model as additional controls for performance. Formally, the second 
model, which adjusts for performance by including prior-year ROA, is as follows: 
 
TAit/Ait-1 = β0 + β1t (1/Ait-1) + β2t ((ΔREVit - ΔRECit) / Ait-1) + β3t (PPEit /Ait-1) + β4t 
(ROAit-1) + εit                                                                                                (2) 
                    
 The definitions of the variables are the same as for model (1) with the inclusion of 
ROAit-1, which is prior year net income divided by prior year total assets.  Again, the 
estimated discretionary accruals, DAROA, are the difference between actual total accruals and 
the fitted values of the accruals from model (2). 
 
4.2. Empirical models  
 For testing Hypothesis 1, we construct a multivariate model with two groups of 
variables, auditor- and client-related, which are traditionally identified as candidates in 
affecting the direction of earnings management. Earnings management is measured by 
discretionary accruals, DACFO and DAROA, and auditor quality by audit firm size, BIGN. 
 The control variables selected represent client financial characteristics.9 Cash flow 
from operations, CFO, is included to control for the potential correlation between accruals 
and cash flows, with negative expected coefficient (Iatridis 2011; Iatridis & Rouvolis 2010; 
Koumanakos et al. 2008; Carey & Simnett 2006; Kothari et al. 2005; Peasnell et al. 2005; 
Chen, Lin, & Zhou 2005; Jeong & Rho 2004; Kim et al. 2003; Myers, Myers, & Omer 2003; 
9 The usefulness of financial information to the detection of falsified financial statements and the qualification 
decision has been investigated at length by Spathis (2002), who demonstrated that firms with high leverage, 
among other variables, are more likely to falsify financial statements. Also, Spathis (2003) found that financial 
distress and current year losses are major indicators of the audit qualification opinion.  In addition, Spathis, 
Doumpos and Zopounidis (2002) and Spathis, Doumpos and Zopounidis (2003) examined the qualification 
decision by exploring the effectiveness of a multicriteria decision aid classification method, UTADIS. The 
results highlighted the importance of financial ratios, such as leverage and inventories to sales, in identifying 
falsified financial statements. Finally, Kirkos, Spathis, Nanopoulos and Manolopoulos (2007) used Decision 
Trees, Neural Networks and Bayesian Networks, and showed that financial distress and profitability are 
strongly related to qualified reports.  
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Becker et al. 1998; Dechow et al. 1995). We include the natural logarithm of total assets, 
SIZE, to control for the firm size effect on discretionary accruals (Iatridis 2011; Iatridis & 
Rouvolis 2010; Choi, Kim, Kim, & Zang 2010; Arnedo et al. 2008; Othman & Zeghal 2006; 
Carey & Simnett 2006; Chen et al. 2005; Jeong & Rho 2004; Kim et al. 2003; Vander 
Bauwhede et al. 2003; Dechow & Dichev 2002; Chung et al. 2002). Empirical studies have 
suggested that size can have a negative or positive association with discretionary accruals 
(Chung et al. 2002; Becker et al. 1998).  
 We also include financial leverage, LEV, because highly leveraged firms may have 
greater incentives for earnings management, either income-increasing or income-decreasing 
(Iatridis & Rouvolis 2010; Choi et al. 2010; Carey & Simnett 2006; Peasnell et al. 2005; 
Butler et al. 2004; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Becker et al. 1998; DeFond & Jiambalvo 
1994). Therefore, the expected sign of this coefficient could be either positive or negative. A 
dummy variable for current year losses, LOSS, is included to account for potential differences 
in discretionary accruals between loss and profit firms, with a negative expected sign (Choi et 
al. 2010; Carey & Simnett 2006; Burgstahler & Dichev 1997; Dopuch, Holthausen, & 
Leftwich 1987). Two variables control for liquidity and efficiency, measured by the current 
ratio, CR (Ryu & Roh 2007; Caramanis & Spathis 2006; Butler et al. 2004) and inventories to 
assets ratio, INV (Johl et al. 2007), respectively, which are direct measures of financial health. 
Our earnings management model is specified as follows:  
 
DAit  = β0+ β1BIGNit + β2CFOit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6CRit +β7INVit  
+ εit                                                                                                                          (3) 
     where for firm i at year t, 
 
DAit                  = signed discretionary accruals; estimated using models (1) and (2), i.e. DACFO it 
and DAROAit, respectively; 
BIGNit     = dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
CFOit                     = cash flow from operations, divided by lagged total assets; 
SIZEit = natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEVit = total debt, divided by total assets;  
LOSSit = dummy variable equal to 1, if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 
otherwise; 
CRit = current assets, divided by current liabilities; 
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INVit   = inventory, divided by total assets 
 
 For Hypotheses 2 and 3 testing, we estimate a logistic regression model, where the 
type of audit opinion, AO, is the dependent dichotomous variable and DACFO and DAROA (H2), 
and BIGN (H3) the test variables, as shown in model (4):  
 
AOit  = β0 + β1DAit + β2BIGNit + β3CFOit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6LOSSit + β7CRit + 
β8INVit + εit                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
where, 
 
AOit = dummy variable equal to 1 for a qualified opinion, i.e. qualified opinion, with 
matters that do not affect the auditor’s overall opinion, qualified opinion, with 
matters that do affect the auditor’s overall opinion, and adverse opinion, and 0 
otherwise. There was no disclaimer of opinion in our sample. 
 
 We apply the same control variables as in model (3) because they have been regularly 
used in prior literature for the explanation of auditors’ decisions to qualify their opinions, 
though the expected signs of some coefficients may be in different directions. CFO is 
expected to be negatively associated with the probability of receiving a qualified opinion 
since more profitable firms are less likely to engage in earnings management than firms with 
financial difficulties (Carey & Simnett 2006; DeFond et al. 2002). SIZE controls for the 
impact client size can have on the propensity of auditors to issue a qualified opinion. Craswell 
et al. (2002) argue that the sign on this coefficient could be either positive or negative; small 
clients are more likely to fail and face going concern problems, which increase the likelihood 
of receiving a qualified opinion. However, the threat of litigation cost in failures of large 
clients may condition auditors to be conservative in their opinions and qualify (Frost 1994).  
 LEV is used to control for the impact of financial risk on the issuance of a qualified 
opinion; a high leverage ratio indicates higher financial risk, and thus, higher probability of a 
qualification (Carey & Simnett 2006; Chan et al. 2006; DeFond et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 
2000). LOSS controls for the impact of operating risk with a positive expected coefficient sign 
(Carey & Simnett 2006; Chan et al. 2006; Spathis 2003; Craswell et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 
2000). A low CR indicates liquidity problems, which increase the propensity of the auditor to 
issue a qualified opinion (Caramanis & Spathis 2006; Chan et al. 2006; Spathis 2003; DeFond 
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et al. 2000). Finally, INV is included to control for the efficiency of the client (Chan et al. 
2006). We expect this variable to be positively correlated with the issuance of a qualified 
opinion. 
 
5. Sample selection and data 
The initial population from which the sample is chosen comprises firms listed on the ASE for 
the five-year period from 2005 to 2009. Data were also collected for 2004 since some 
variables of our models required beginning of year values. Following common practice in 
previous literature, Banking, Insurance, Financial Services and Real Estate Sectors are 
excluded because discretionary accruals estimation is problematic for these firms (DeFond & 
Subramanyam 1998). Additionally, sectors with less than ten firms are omitted from the 
sample. Therefore, from a total of 18 sectors, only 9 are included: Metals, Construction & 
Materials of Construction, Food & Beverages, Travelling & Leisure, Information Technology, 
Communication, Trade, Personal & Domestic Products, and Industrial Products & Services. 
 Another six IPO firms were not included because in the first year a firm goes public, it 
tends to manipulate earnings, and this may affect the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit 
opinion (Caramanis & Spathis 2006). Firms engaged in mergers, acquisitions or seasoned 
equity offerings were not eliminated from the sample because Greek empirical studies 
indicate no evidence of earnings management adoption around these events (Koumanakos et 
al. 2005). Moreover, 18 firms were excluded from the empirical analysis because they were 
audited by both a Big 4 and a non-Big 4 auditor.10 To reduce the impact of outlier 
observations on the results, we winsorize observations that fall in the top 1% and bottom 1% 
of the empirical distribution of each variable (Chung et al. 2002). 
 Data availability for the calculation of total accruals and the estimation of the 
variables used in hypotheses testing further reduced the sample size, resulting in roughly 978 
firm-year observations. Firms with incomplete five-year data were not excluded from the 
analysis, resulting in a different number of observations in each of the five years. Information 
about audit reports of listed firms was hand-collected from the ASE online database.11 Annual 
financial statement data for the sample firms were provided by Hellastat S.A. 
10 For listed firms satisfying certain criteria, the audit is conducted by two auditors. When this is the case, one 
auditor may belong to a Big 4 audit firm and the other to a non-Big 4, making the categorization difficult. 
11 www.ase.gr 
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6. Empirical results 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 summarizes the types of audit opinion issued by the audit firms in our sample. 
Interestingly, Big 4 firms issue only two audit opinion types, unqualified (76.3%), and 
qualified with matters that do not affect auditor’s opinion (23.7%). Non-Big 4 firms issue 
almost equal numbers of unqualified and qualified opinions, including in the qualified sample 
a 1.5% of adverse opinion reports.  
(Table 1 About Here) 
 In Table 2, the descriptive statistics and univariate tests for the variables used in the 
empirical analysis are presented. The table is divided into three panels, A, B and C. The 
descriptive statistics for the full sample are summarized in Panel A, for 978 firm-year 
observations. Panels B and C show the descriptive statistics categorized by audit firm size and 
audit opinion type, respectively.  
(Table 2 About Here) 
 In Panel B, the mean differences are statistically significant for most variables, except 
for the discretionary accruals (DAROA), CFO and CR. Total accruals (TA) and discretionary 
accruals (DACFO) are significantly different between firms with Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. 
Discretionary accruals have positive mean values (mean DACFO = 0.012 and mean DAROA = 
0.003) in the Big 4 group, which implies a tendency to overestimate accruals, resulting in an 
upwards earnings management effect. Discretionary accruals have negative mean values 
(mean DACFO = -0.006 and mean DAROA = -0.001) in the non-Big 4 group, implying a 
tendency to underestimate accruals and, thus, to manage earnings downwards. Additionally, 
size (SIZE) and leverage (LEV) are significantly different between the two samples. Clients 
of Big 4 audit firms are larger in size (mean = 18.955) and less leveraged (mean = 0.483) 
compared to clients of non-Big 4.  
 Panel C distinguishes between firms with qualified and unqualified opinions. Once 
more, TA, discretionary accruals (DACFO), size (SIZE) and leverage (LEV) have statistically 
significant differences in mean values between the two groups. Firms with qualified opinions 
have negative mean total accruals and discretionary accruals, compared to firms with 
unqualified opinions, implying a propensity to underestimate accruals and, thus, to manage 
earnings downwards. Furthermore, firms with unqualified opinions are larger in size (mean = 
18.376) and less leveraged (mean = 0.492). 
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 Descriptive statistics of the discrete variable LOSS (current year losses) are shown in 
Table 3, where 204 of the 275 firms with current year losses were audited by non-Big 4 audit 
firms (chi-square = 10.061, p < 0.000). Examination of the table also shows that 133 of the 
275 firms with losses in the current year received a qualified opinion. The difference between 
the two groups of firms reported is significant (chi-square = 15.788, p < 0.000).  
(Table 3 About Here) 
 Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the test and control variables. 
Correlations among the test variables are weak. DACFO and DAROA are positively correlated 
with BIGN, but the correlations are small and not very significant. AO is negatively 
correlated with DA and BIGN, but again the correlations are not very strong. We note that 
significant correlations exist between a few pairs of variables. LOSS and DACFO (-0.433), 
SIZE and BIGN (0.427), and OCF and DAROA (-0.457) at the 1% significance level. Our 
discretionary accruals measures, DACFO and DAROA, are highly positively correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.682, and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that they are 
mean-reverting over time (Kim et al. 2003).  
(Table 4 About Here) 
 Since there is no correlation coefficient higher than 0.8, multicollinearity does not 
seem to cause problems in the multivariate analysis (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, & Lee 
1988), where the simultaneous effect of these variables will be examined. 
 
6.2. Regression results for Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 tests the association between discretionary accruals, DACFO and DAROA, 
estimated by two alternative models, the cross-sectional modified-Jones model with CFO 
(Larcker & Richardson 2004), and the cross-sectional modified-Jones model with prior year 
ROA (Kothari et al., 2005), respectively, and the size of the audit firm, BIGN. The results of 
the OLS regression for the full and annual samples are presented in Table 5. In model  
(3a), DACFO is used as the dependent variable, while DAROA is the dependent variable in 
model (3b). The signs of the coefficients are in the expected directions. To examine whether 
the results of cross-sectional regression are driven by potential problems of serial correlation, 
we estimate model (3) separately for each of the five years from 2005 to 2009 (Chung et al. 
2002).  
(Table 5 About Here) 
 We are primarily concerned with the sign and significance of the coefficient β1. In 
Table 5, both models, (3a) and (3b), give similar results for the BIGN variable. Although the 
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estimated value of the coefficient is not exactly zero, it is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. This means that Hypothesis 1 is accepted; the BIGN variable does not explain variations 
in discretionary accruals, DACFO and DAROA, and it could, therefore, be removed from the 
model. This result is consistent with other studies, which report that there is lack of Big 4 
differentiation in the level of discretionary accruals employed by a firm (Othman & Zeghal 
2006; Carey & Simnett 2006; Peasnell et al. 2005; Jeong & Rho 2004; Vander Bauwhede & 
Willekens 2004). 
 The interpretation of this result, however, is subject to the particular characteristics of 
the economic environment and institutional setting of Greece. Possible reasons are the 
economic bonding of auditors with their clients, especially when the client is large. In fact, it 
appears that the economic incentives encourage them to retain existing clients, and attract new 
clients, by compromising independence in judgment. The incentive is stronger, than the 
possibility of penalties they would pay by providing low, rather than, high quality audits. This 
argument is reinforced by the fact that audit firms operate in a relatively small market where 
investor protection is low, enforcement mechanisms are weak and there is low litigation and 
reputation loss.  
  The variance in discretionary accruals is better explained by client financial 
characteristics. CFO is significant at the 1% level in both models (3a) and (3b). As predicted, 
it is negatively related to discretionary accruals, a finding consistent with previous studies 
(Iatridis 2011; Iatridis & Rouvolis 2010; Carey & Simnett 2006; Peasnell et al. 2005; Chen et 
al. 2005; Jeong & Rho 2004; Kim et al. 2003; Becker et al. 1998; Dechow et al. 1995), 
implying that firms with low cash flows tend to use accrual-increasing accounting policies. 
LOSS is significant at the 1% significance level and is negatively associated with DA for 
nearly all years, in both, (3a) and (3b), models. Finally, and mainly in model (3a), LEV is 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals (consistent with Iatridis & Rouvolis 2010; 
Chen et al. 2005; Kim et al. 2003, Becker et al. 1998). The explanatory power of model (3) is 
satisfactory and explains much of the dependent variable, with an adjusted R2 ranging from 
18.1% to 74.4%.  
 In Section 7.1, we perform an additional analysis with positive and negative 
discretionary accruals samples because discretionary accruals can imply two distinct 
situations, with either upwards or downwards earnings management incentives. 
 
6.3. Regression results for Hypotheses 2 and 3 
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The results of the logistic regression model (4) are presented in Table 6. Both models, (4a) 
and (4b), give similar results because their only difference is the independent variable of 
discretionary accruals, DACFO and DAROA, which is not significant.  
(Table 6 About Here) 
 With respect to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient β1 is negative but, as predicted, not 
significant, at all significance levels in both (4a) and (4b) models, which implies that 
discretionary accruals do not provide any help in explaining the type of audit opinion issued 
by the audit firm. Taking the results of Hypotheses 1 and 2 together, we find that the size of 
the audit firm does not affect the level of earnings management, and the audit opinion 
qualification is not issued in response to management’s opportunistic behaviour.  
 Furthermore, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between Big 4 
audit firms and the probability of receiving a qualified opinion, except for the years 2005 and 
2009, supporting the argument that firms audited by Big 4 auditors are more likely to receive 
an unqualified opinion, leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 3. This result is inconsistent 
with previous studies, which document that Big 4 audit firms are more likely to issue 
qualified opinions, compared with non-Big 4 firms (Gaeremynck et al. 2008; Gaeremynck & 
Willekens 2003; DeFond et al. 2002), or studies with insignificant relationship between the 
Big 4 and the audit qualification variable (Caramanis & Spathis 2006;12 Chan et al. 2006; 
Bartov et al. 2000). 
 We conjecture that since audit quality is the same for Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, 
regarding the constraint of clients’ earnings management, there should also be no 
differentiation in the audit qualification. Thus, the fact that Big 4 auditors have a greater 
propensity to issue unqualified reports could be attributed to client characteristics, and not to 
audit quality per se, as indicated by the significantly negative control variable SIZE. Clients 
of Big 4 are larger in size,13 with international orientation, and adjust more to corporate 
governance mechanisms and the implementation of IFRS. These factors indicate that they 
have a lower likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. An additional explanation could be 
that the economic bonding between auditors and large clients is even stronger, encouraging 
12 Interestingly, Caramanis and Spathis (2006) found for a sample of 185 Greek listed firms that the size of the 
audit firm does not affect auditors’ qualification decision. Nonetheless, their analysis was performed in 2001, a 
pre-IFRS period, with the majority of reports issued being qualified, which signified a lower financial reporting 
quality irrespective of client size. 
13 In 2009, the rank of audited financial statements of FTSE ASE 20 was: PwC 33.3% (1st), Ernst & Young 
19% (2nd), KPMG 14.3% (3rd), Deloitte 9.5% (4th), and SOL S.A. 4.8% (5th) (Hellastat 2009). 
                                                          
24 
auditors to act less conservatively, and report more favourably, in an effort to retain their 
influential clients. However, this condition impairs the exercise of auditors’ independent 
judgment. 
 Regarding the rest of the control variables, the coefficient of LEV has, as predicted, a 
positive sign and is significant, except for the years 2006 and 2007. A high leverage ratio 
indicates higher financial risk, and thus, higher probability of a qualification (Carey & 
Simnett 2006; Chan et al. 2006; DeFond et al. 2000). Finally, LOSS is positively significant 
in models (4a) and (4b) only in the years 2008 and 2009. This result is consistent with prior 
studies, which suggest that financially poor firms have a greater tendency to receive qualified 
opinions than healthier firms (Chan et al. 2006; Spathis 2003; Craswell et al. 2002; DeFond et 
al. 2000). Pseudo R-Square14 ranges from 10.2% to 34.2% and implies a relatively strong 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
7. Sensitivity tests 
 To test whether the relationships examined are affected by our design choices, we 
perform a series of additional sensitivity tests.  
 
7.1. Positive vs. negative discretionary accruals  
 We divide our sample into positive and negative discretionary accruals to investigate 
if our results differ when managers have incentives to either overstate reported earnings, 
through income-increasing accruals, or to understate reported earnings through income-
decreasing accruals (see Jenkins, Kane, & Velury 2006; Othman & Zeghal 2006; Kim et al. 
2003; Myers et al. 2003). The results of model (3) in Table 7 indicate that auditor size does 
not have any effect on constraining upwards or downwards earnings management of the client 
firm (Othman & Zeghal, 2006); the coefficient of BIGN is not significant for either the 
positive or negative discretionary accruals samples, and Hypothesis 1 is accepted.  
(Table 7 About Here) 
 With respect to the control variables, our analysis reveals that firms with strong 
operating cash flows are less likely to use either positive or negative discretionary accruals, as 
the coefficient CFO is significantly negative for both samples. The coefficient on LEV is 
significantly positive in the positive discretionary accruals sample and significantly negative 
in the negative discretionary accruals sample, indicating that firms with increased leverage 
14 Nagelkerke R-Square 
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manage earnings upwards. In both samples, current year losses, LOSS, are linked to a lower 
magnitude of earnings-management behaviour. 
  In Table 8, consistent with our main analysis in Section 6.3, we find that Hypothesis 2 
is accepted. Hypothesis 3 is also rejected, as BIGN is negatively significant in both samples. 
Finally, SIZE (negative coefficient) and LEV (positive coefficient) are significant only for the 
negative discretionary accruals sample, which reveals that smaller firms and firms with high 
leverage are more likely to receive qualified opinions. 
(Table 8 About Here) 
 
7.2. Additional discretionary accrual models  
 To check the robustness of the estimation of discretionary accruals, we re-run models 
(3) and (4) using discretionary accruals estimated by two additional models: the Jones model 
(1991) and the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995).15 The use of these accrual 
measurements does not yield considerably different results to those reported in Section 6. 
Regarding model (3), the test variable BIGN is not significant in explaining DA, both DAJ 
and DAmJ. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1. LOSS, LEV and CFO coefficients are, 
again, negative and significant at the 1% level in both DAJ and DAmJ models for the full and 
annual samples. As for model (4), the results are similar to those reported in Section 6. For 
brevity, we do not report the analytical tables of the results.  
 
7.3. Excluding CFO from models (3) and (4) 
 The variable CFO is used to estimate discretionary accruals in model (1) of our 
empirical analysis. We drop this variable from models (3) and (4) to check the robustness of 
our results. We find that BIGN, again, is not significant (Hypothesis 1 accepted) and LOSS is 
negatively associated with DA at the 1% significance level for models (3a) and (3b). 
Hypothesis 2 is again accepted. Once more, the BIGN variable is strongly and negatively 
associated with AO at the 1% significance level for models (4a) and (4b), and thus Hypothesis 
3 is rejected. Additionally, SIZE (negative coefficient) and LEV (positive coefficient) are 
15 DAJit or DAmJit = β0 + β1BIGNit + β2CFOit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6CRit + β7INVit + εit   (for model 
3), where DAj is discretionary accruals, estimated using the Jones model (1991), and DAmj is discretionary 
accruals, estimated using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995).     
AOit = β0 + β1(DAJit or DAmJit) + β2BIGNit + β3CFOit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6LOSSit   + β7CRit + β8INVit + εit   
(for model 4) 
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associated with AO at the 1% significance level. In sum, the results are similar to those 
reported in our main analysis, supporting the strength of our tests. For brevity, we do not 
report the analytical tables of the results.  
 
8. Conclusions, limitations and future research  
This study investigated the role of auditors in potentially approving managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour, i.e. earnings management, in the post-IFRS period from 2005 to 2009. As a proxy 
for earnings management we used discretionary accruals, and as proxies for auditor reporting, 
we used audit firm size (Big 4 vs. non-Big 4) and audit opinion type (unqualified vs. 
qualified).  
 The effects of the unusual characteristics of the economic environment and 
institutional setting of code-law Greece are evidenced in the results. The empirical analysis 
reveals that auditors, either Big 4 or non-Big 4, have weak incentives to prevent earnings 
management. The economic bonding of auditors with their clients leads them to behave 
opportunistically themselves. The relatively small market, where disciplinary authorities are 
weak and the likelihood of getting caught by the government is low, combined with the low 
reputation loss, strengthens this behaviour. The variation in discretionary accruals is better 
explained by client financial characteristics, such as profitability and leverage. As for the 
audit qualification decision, we documented that the audit report is not issued in response to 
discretionary accruals. Additionally, Big 4 auditors have a greater propensity to issue 
unqualified reports. This finding is attributed to client characteristics and not to the quality of 
the auditor. Clients of Big 4 firms are larger in size, with international orientation, and adjust 
more to IFRS and corporate governance mechanisms. Also, the economic bonding between 
auditors and large clients is even stronger, encouraging auditors to act less conservatively. 
Finally, apart from size, leverage also explains the audit qualification.  
 We conclude that, despite improvements in reliability, transparency, comparability 
conditional conservatism and value relevance with the implementation of IFRS, especially for 
large firms, as evidenced in the literature (Ballas et al., 2010; Iatridis & Rouvolis, 2010; 
Karampinis & Hevas, 2011), the particular characteristics of the Greek context still influence 
auditor and financial reporting.  
 Our results are subject to the limitations of similar empirical studies. First, accrual 
models have received repeated criticism for providing biased and noisy estimates of discretion 
(Stubben, 2010) and researchers are not in consensus on the superiority or higher reliability of 
any particular model (Bartov et al., 2000; Bernard & Skinner, 1996; Dechow et al., 1995; 
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Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996; Kothari et al., 2005). Second, concerning the audit firm size 
proxy, Dang (2004) claimed that it is unlikely that all Big 4 auditors or  all non-Big 4 auditors 
offer the same level of audit quality at a moment in time and across different time periods. 
These limitations could be taken into consideration as opportunities for future research. 
Future research could also conduct a content analysis on the qualifications of the audit reports 
in order to provide more profound explanations for the relationship between earnings 
management and auditor qualification.  
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Table 1 
Audit opinion type by audit firm size (2005-2009). 
 Big 4 Non-Big 4 Total 
Unqualified 246 76.3% 359 54.7% 605 61.9% 
Qualified opinion, with matters that 
do not affect auditor’s overall opinion 
76 23.7% 266 40.5% 342 35.0% 
Qualified opinion, with matters that 
affect auditor’s overall opinion 
0 0.0% 21 3.3% 21 2.1% 
Adverse opinion 0 0.0% 10 1.5% 10 1.0% 
Disclaimer of opinion 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Total 322 100.0% 656 100.0% 978 100.0% 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests of continuous variables.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (full 
sample, N = 978) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. 
TA  0.005 0.116 -1.422  0.006  0.684 
DACFO  0.001 0.090 -0.520  0.001  0.432 
DAROA  0.000 0.094 -0.916  0.002  0.423 
CFO   0.023 0.205 -5.466   0.014  2.095 
SIZE 18.226 1.235 14.438 18.106 22.181 
LEV   0.530 0.278   0.001    0.005   2.564 
CR   2.192 4.064   0.003    1.452  70.598 
INV   0.121 0.106   0.000    0.101     0.611 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics and univariate test of continuous variables by audit firm size 
 Big 4 (N = 322)   Non-Big 4 (N = 656)  Differences 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.  t-statistic 
TA   0.016  0.075 -0.200  0.008 0.410   0.000 0.132 -0.815 0.004   0.684      -2.535*** 
DACFO   0.012  0.073 -0.187   0.001 0.412  -0.004 0.096 -0.520 0.000   0.432      -3.268*** 
DAROA   0.003  0.068 -0.352   0.003 0.346  -0.001 0.105 -0.916 0.002   0.423  -0.639 
CFO   0.033  0.104 -0.275   0.016  0.754    0.018 0.240 -5.466  0.013   2.095  -1.480 
SIZE 18.955  1.186 15.587 18.769 22.181  17.862 1.091 14.438 17.655   20.834        15.322*** 
LEV   0.483  0.221   0.008   0.012   1.778    0.572 0.481   0.001   2.589     8.447       -5.000*** 
CR   1.994  2.426   0.012   1.506 35.444    2.291 4.672   0.003   1.434   70.598    1.294 
INV   0.110  0.087   0.000   0.096   0.492    0.126 0.115   0.000    0.104     0.611       -2.400** 
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Table 2 continued 
 
TA: total accruals divided by lagged total assets; DACFO: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-
Jones model with CFO (Larcker and Richardson, 2004); DAROA: discretionary accruals estimated using the 
modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA (Kothari et al., 2005); CFO: cash flow from operations divided by 
lagged total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt divided by total assets; CR: current 
assets divided by current liabilities; INV: inventory divided by total assets;  
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics and univariate test of continuous variables by audit opinion type 
 Qualified opinion  (N = 381)   Unqualified opinion (N = 597)  Differences 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.  t-statistic 
TA -0.006 0.143 -0.815  0.005 0.684   0.012 0.095 -0.410  0.006   0.410    2.314*** 
DACFO -0.013 0.102 -0.520 -0.002 0.291   0.010 0.080 -0.258  0.003   0.432    4.022*** 
DAROA -0.001 0.094 -0.382   0.004 0.381   0.001 0.094 -0.916 -0.001   0.423    0.482 
CFO    0.009 0.301 -5.466   0.005 2.095   0.032 0.107 -0.311  0.018   0.754    1.509 
SIZE 17.985 1.201 14.438 17.772 22.181  18.376 1.233 15.152 18.312 22.155  -5.137*** 
LEV   0.622 0.609  0.008   1.056  8.447    0.492 0.204   0.001  0.513   1.363    4.799*** 
CR    2.267 4.711   0.003   1.362 70.598    2.145 3.602   0.052  1.523 44.730   -0.498 
INV   0.116 0.105   0.000    0.097  0.605    0.123 0.107   0.000  0.102    0.611   -1.023 
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Table 3 
Chi-square test of the discrete variable LOSS. 
Variable Non-Big 4 (N = 656) Big 4 (N = 352) Chi-square 
LOSS    
(Yes) 204 71 
10.061*** 
(No) 452 251 
Variable Unqualified Opinion (N = 597) Qualified Opinion (N = 381) Chi-square 
LOSS    
(Yes) 142 133 
15.788*** 
(No) 455 248 
LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 otherwise. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 4 
Pearson correlation matrix. 
*Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
 DACFO DAROA AO BIGN OCF SIZE LEV LOSS CR INV 
DACFO 1          
DAROA    0.682** 1         
AO  -0.132** -0.015 1        
BIGN    0.088**  0.016   -0.189** 1       
OCF 0.000    -0.457** -0.055 0.035 1      
SIZE     0.002** -0.024   -0.152**     0.427**  0.029 1     
LEV    -0.212** -0.021     0.162**    -0.133**    -0.095**  -0.064* 1    
LOSS    -0.433**    -0.138**     0.120**    -0.096**    -0.131**    -0.145**  0.226** 1   
CR -0.018  -0.011  0.016 -0.032   0.000 -0.053 -0.321** -0.058 1  
INV     0.091**       0.150** -0.032   -0.070*  -0.002    -0.162**  0.104** -0.039 0.009 1 
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Table 5  
Regression results of audit firm size and other control variables on discretionary accruals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DACFOit  =  β0+ β1BIGNit + β2CFOit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6CRit +β7INVit + εit            (3a)                                                                             
 Expected Sign Full Sample 2009 2008 2007   2006 2005 
Constant ? -0.027 -0.030 -0.028    -0.171*  -0.076 -0.071 
BIG N ?  0.005  0.016  0.015 -0.008   0.002 0.010 
CFO - -0.006        -0.220***     -0.117** -0.019  -0.062 -0.320*** 
SIZE ?      0.004**   0.004  0.005       0.011**    0.007 0.007 
LEV ?        -0.065***  -0.037      -0.090***    -0.050*       -0.045** -0.069*** 
LOSS -       -0.084***        -0.076***      -0.094***        -0.084***         -0.085*** -0.096*** 
CR ?       -0.002***      -0.002**     -0.003**   0.000   -0.002 -0.003 
INV ?     0.089*   0.011     0.139*        0.253**     0.008 0.060 
        F-value       47.926***        20.733***      14.825***          9.850***           9.712*** 24.891*** 
R 2  0.252 0.440 0.339    0.237    0.228 0.450 
DAROAit  =  β0+ β1BIGNit + β2CFOit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6CRit+ β7INVit + εit          (3b) 
 
 
                                                                                     
 Expected Sign Full  Sample 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Constant ? 0.046 -0.026 -0.027 -0.145 -0.032  0.015 
BIG N ? 0.008  0.005  0.012 -0.005 -0.003  0.003 
CFO -      -0.219***        -0.805***      -0.579***        -0.047***       -0.652***      -0.531*** 
SIZE ? -0.002  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.005  0.001 
LEV ? -0.008  0.021    -0.045**  0.035 -0.024    -0.037** 
LOSS -        -0.045*** -0.010      -0.050***   -0.025*       -0.054***      -0.031*** 
CR ?  0.000  0.000  -0.002*  0.000 -0.002     -0.003** 
INV ?      0.127**  0.047     0.122*   0.324 -0.018    0.106* 
        F-value        51.699***       86.707***      29.291***        7.274***       36.730***     100.755*** 
R 2   0.267  0.773 0.512  0.181 0.548  0.774 
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DACFO: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model with CFO (Larcker & Richardson, 2004); DAROA: discretionary accruals 
estimated using the modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA (Kothari et al. 2005); BIG N: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 
otherwise; CFO:  cash flow from operations divided by lagged total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt divided by total 
assets; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 otherwise CR: current assets divided by current liabilities; 
INV:  inventory divided by total assets;  
*     Significant at the 0.10 level.   
**   Significant at the 0.05 level.  
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.  
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 Table 6  
Logistic regression results of discretionary accruals, audit firm size and other control variables on audit opinion type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AOit = β0  +  β1DACFOit + β2BIGNit + β3CFOit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6LOSSit + β7CRit+ β8INVit + εit                  (4a) 
 Expected 
 
Full Sample 2009 2008 2007   2006 2005 
Constant ?      2.510** -1.328 -0.039 1.185 0.600   1.795 
DACFO ? -2.038  -0.519 -3.151 -4.551 -2.733  -5.021 
BIG N ?        -0.629***  -0.895     -1.435**       -0.948***       -1.026*** -0.223 
CFO -    -1.472*  -3.872 -3.880 -1.013 -1.217 -0.306 
SIZE ?         -0.188***    -0.195*     -0.154**   -0.078* -0.058 -0.184 
LEV +          1.280***        3.583**     2.152*  0.614  1.199         2.858*** 
LOSS +    0.004        1.721**       1.239** -0.393   0.601 -0.204 
CR -    0.023    0.058   0.004  0.025   0.027       0.370** 
INV +       -1.311**   -1.029  -3.196 -0.443 -0.720  -0.141 
        Wald         66.558***     73.436***        67.856***       4.466**  0.584          9.340*** 
Pseudo R 2      0.105  0.330   0.342  0.129  0.162   0.159 
AOit = β0  +  β1DAROAit + β2BIGNit + β3CFOit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6LOSSit + β7CRit+ β8INVit + εit               (4b)                                                                     
 Expected 
 
Full  Sample 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Constant ?       2.534** -1.091 -0.185  1.207  0.682  1.995 
DAROA ? -1.066  6.750 -0.249 -3.893 -2.424 -1.541 
BIG N ?       -0.630*** -0.895     -1.475**     -0.920**       -1.031*** -0.238 
CFO - -1.547  1.460 -2.926 -2.035 -2.549   0.060 
SIZE ?       -0.194***   -0.219*      -0.156**   -0.087* -0.063 -0.203 
LEV +         1.373***       3.388**       2.347**   0.804   1.239         2.971*** 
LOSS +   0.130        1.812***         1.533*** -0.161     0.703*   0.217 
CR -   0.026  0.062   0.011   0.029   0.027        0.375** 
INVA +      -1.353** -1.056  -3.462  -0.497  -0.789  -0.265 
        Wald        67.693***      69.589***        70.201***      3.546**    0.796          8.247*** 
Pseudo R 2   0.102 0.341    0.336  0.115    0.159    0.134 
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AO: dummy variable equal to 1 for a qualified opinion, 0 otherwise; DACFO:discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model 
with CFO (Larcker & Richardson, 2004); DAROA: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA 
(Kothari et al., 2005); BIG N: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; CFO = cash flow from operations divided by 
lagged total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt divided by total assets; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if loss is 
experienced in the current year, 0 otherwise CR: current assets divided by current liabilities; INV: inventory divided by total assets;    
*     Significant at the 0.10 level.  
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 7 
Regression results of model (3) with positive and negative discretionary accruals samples. 
DAit =  β0+ β1BIGNit + β2CFOit + β3SIZEit + β4LEVit + β5LOSSit + β6CRit + β7INVit + εit       (3)              
 
                                                                   
 DA+  DA- 
 
 DA CFO DA ROA        DA CFO DA ROA 
Constant -0.033      0.096**  -0.070 -0.036 
BIG N -0.004 -0.002    0.012  0.009 
CFO  0.022        -0.091***       -0.026**        -0.492*** 
SIZE  0.004    -0.004*    0.004   0.003 
LEV  0.023          0.054***          -0.103***         -0.062*** 
LOSS   -0.020*         -0.022***          -0.022***         -0.043*** 
CR  0.001    0.001       -0.002*     -0.001* 
INV   0.045       0.081*        0.087*       0.101* 
      
F-value      2.116**          20.730***       26.626***        49.006*** 
R 2  0.015      0.215  0.285    0.416 
 
DACFO: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model with CFO (Larcker & Richardson, 
2004); DAROA: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA 
(Kothari et al., 2005); BIGN: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; CFO: cash flow 
from operations divided by lagged total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt 
divided by total assets; LOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 
otherwise CR: current assets divided by current liabilities; INV: inventory divided by total assets;     
 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level.  
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 8 
Regression results of model (4) with positive and negative discretionary accruals samples. 
AOit = β0  +  β1DAit+ β2BIGNit + β3CFOit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6LOSSit + +β7CRit+ β8INVit + εit    (4)                                                                               
                                                                                      DA+                     DA- 
 DA CFO DA ROA  DA CFO DA ROA 
Constant  0.542   2.940         4.534**  2.609 
DA   -2.952*  -4.322    -2.628 -0.096 
BIG N        -0.772***    -0.622*      -0.477*        -0.722*** 
CFO -1.337  -1.153    -1.549 -1.466 
SIZE -0.046  -0.177           -0.329***      -0.227** 
LEV   0.158   0.657            2.007***          2.111*** 
LOSS -0.306   0.074      0.204   0.212 
CR   0.056   0.051      0.025   0.007 
INV -0.406  -1.868         -2.665**  -0.503 
      Wald        43.274***         22.781***          23.992***       45.984*** 
Pseudo R 2    0.062     0.083     0.200   0.168 
 
AO: dummy variable equal to 1 for a qualified opinion, 0 otherwise; DACFO: discretionary accruals estimated 
using the modified-Jones model with CFO (Larcker & Richardson, 2004); DAROA: discretionary accruals 
estimated using the modified-Jones model with prior-year ROA (Kothari et al., 2005); BIG N: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; CFO: cash flow from operations divided by lagged 
total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets; LEV: total debt divided by total assets; LOSS: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if loss is experienced in the current year, 0 otherwise CR: current assets divided by current 
liabilities; INV: inventory divided by total assets;    
 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level.  
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
